Faculty e-mails.

I am missing quite a few of these. In an attempt to keep my box open I was deleting them often to leave room for student postings. If you have copies, please forward it and indicate where on the page it should be inserted, not where I should insert it ;-)  Also, only public e-mails should be posted. If I have mistakenly posted a private e-mail please tell me and I'll immediately remove it.

The only changes I have made is to fix the font so they are all the same and easier to read.

Et all.

I would have to echo the stance of my fellow colleagues and friends Joshua and Milton (and the silent majority minority that does not dare to speak out). As a newbie, it is unreal that something like this can happen at a private Catholic Liberal Arts School. In the words of Joe Miller played bv Denzel Washington in the film Philadelphia: “Now, explain that to me like I am a six year old…”

Nelson López

Foreign Languages and International Studies

I too stand in solidarity with this growing group!  

As a white man I have struggled with my own lack of understanding of these complex issues, at times allowing injustice and hatred to prevail when I should have stood up and shouted no! 

No longer.  

What is occurring on campus are symptoms of much larger issues that we must all grapple with…why not begin that challenge right now? I can not allow myself to placate my reaction to issues such as these any longer!

I also want to support my brothers and sisters who have voiced their civil disobedience and I stand with anyone who opposes hatred and oppression in all its forms. 

It also strikes me that this technology and electronic media is being used quite well for “enhancing and furthering the mission of the University,” if that mission involves social justice and the improvement of the human condition.  That said, I fear the students may not have the same opportunity to share their voice in this discussion as they may not be able to “reply all” in the same way that we, the professors, have so far.  

I would like to suggest another public forum (as we have had three of them to date) called by the administration in order to have a free and full airing of the multitude of views surrounding this issue. 

In peace. adam

First they came... is a poem attributed to Pastor Martin Niemöller (1892-1984) about the quiescence of German intellectuals following the Nazi rise to power and the purging of their chosen targets, group after group.

First they came for the communists, and I did not speak out--
    because I was not a communist;
Then they came for the socialists, and I did not speak out--
    because I was not a socialist;
Then they came for the trade unionists, and I did not speak out--
    because I was not a trade unionist;
Then they came for the Jews, and I did not speak out--
    because I was not a Jew;
Then they came for me--
    and there was no one left to speak out for me.

I believe we at Bellarmine must speak out against the on campus display by a student of Neo-Nazi symbols that represent hatred and persecution.

Dr. Gretchen Anderson

Friends, 

I composed this yesterday and meant it to be forwarded to this discussion, but apparently didn’t reply to all. There are a few additions to the original based on some of the comments I read today. Originally I intended on writing a letter supporting Josh’s position, but found the arguments flawed in many ways. I was surprised to find myself supporting the student’s right. The original follows…

As a child my parents and friends taught me that “Sticks and stones will break my bones, but words will never hurt me”. Today, most seem to have forgotten this simple phrase and many campuses have devolved into a “political correctness” movement. I would hate for PC to become a driving force at this institution under any circumstances (although it has a foothold, to be sure).

I believe this student has a free speech right to wear and display whatever he wants as long as he is not disruptive (and not just visually disruptive). As an academic community, I think we must support free speech, even when we find it uncomfortable. 

To be very clear; I do not agree with the message he is sending, but I support his right to do so. All three of my children are Jewish because their mothers are, so I can not agree with his point of view. The message does seem to support the Holocaust, one of the darkest events in our history and one we seem to be repeating under the Bush administration, but again, he has a right to freedom of expression. It does smack of bigotry, but that’s his right. I find it offensive, but he has the right to rattle my cage. 

Indeed, Bellarmine is an independent Catholic university that seeks to provide “…respect for the intrinsic value and dignity of each person”, but by that definition, he also would also deserve respect and should not be forced to follow the will of the majority. 

I fully understand that most on campus would like to force him into the choice of removing these symbols or leaving, but at what point does it stop? Should Goths be allowed on campus? I know that makes at least one other faculty member in my department uncomfortable. How about students that dress in leather? Or those with excessive piercings and/or tattoos?  

Primarily, Bellarmine is a place of education that should be strong enough to discuss any and all points of view. We don’t have to agree with those points of view, but we have no right to exclude any. To be sure, free speech has limits, but I don’t think this meets those limits. I am sorry to disagree, but “Sticks and stones….” 

Bill Tietjen
Department of Biology

I support freedom of speech also but I believe that there is a different between free speech and hate speech.  After doing the research this organization clearly represents hate speech.  So I ask you to steep out side your privdeldge and realize that free speech and hate speech are two seperate things. 

NOTE FROM Dr. Bill: I am not sure if this was a student comment or not. However, I am including it here because I suspect it was placed incorrectly in the student section with the name removed.

Bill,

I am appauled at your response to Marc's e-mail. "I hope next semister we can apply the energy to other problems." That is a typical response from a person such as yourself, who was born with the privalage to discard the feelings of the black people on campus. You and your thoughts on this nazi, Ian Stuart loving, National Socialist are prime examples of why black people and other minorities (including lower class white people) will never achieve equality. Because YOU, and PEOPLE LIKE YOU, including the Bellarmine Administration, continue to contribute to the oppression of blacks, while protecting an immoral, and unethical person such as Andrei, and while claiming to be a Catholic, Top Ranked College in the Region that supports minorities and provides a safe environment for them. THEY DO NOT FEEL SAFE!!! CAN YOU PEOPLE NOT GET THAT!!! When do we decide that his speech has harmed someone.

I guess when "THE WHITE MANS POWER AND PRIVALAGE IS THREATENED"

AND OBVIOUSLY YOU CAN SEE OUR POWER HAS NOT BEEN THREATENED.

MESSAGE FROM Dr. Bill: I have been getting too much of this kind of accusation and of being accused of being a racist because I don't agree with what I am told I should believe in. I am offended that anyone would accuse me so. A response is here. Note that I have left the faculty member's name off this e-mail.

Dear Members of the Bellarmine University Community: 

Bellarmine is a place where talented people of all faiths and many ages, nations and cultures develop the intellectual, moral and professional competencies for lifelong learning, leadership, service to others, careers and responsible, values-based, caring lives. 

We are a place of academic excellence and we are a community that respects the intrinsic value and dignity of each person. 

As many of you know, one member of our university community has chosen to wear an armband representing certain views that are completely repugnant and entirely contrary to these values of inclusiveness, diversity and respect. 

Virtually to a person, we in the Bellarmine Community totally reject these views and are deeply troubled that this student is expressing them in this way. However, we have responded to the situation in different ways. 

Some among us believe the University should charge in, declare that the armband is hate speech and that hate speech is conduct, and then take strong disciplinary action against the armband wearer. This is the understandable emotional reaction of some of the good and sincere souls among us. Loving people hate hate speech. And some among us  appear not to understand the necessity and importance of free speech in an open and conversational university -- and the unique opportunity that only this free speech provides for destroying the viability of hateful, exclusionary ideas. 

But within the context of an institution that is a true, open, free, conversational university, a place of inquiry and academic excellence, a place that is preparing leaders who will be effective in the world, censoring speech ultimately is indefensible. In its own way, it is as contrary to being a true university as the point of view of the speech in question is contrary to our University’s values of inclusiveness and mutual respect. 

We must take this opportunity to act like a real community and to learn together as a real community in and around a serious set of issues that concern us all and are of particular importance to a private Catholic university in the United States of America. 

A good place to start is to learn the facts. 

Where is our student coming from on this?  Why is he wearing the armband?  What does he hope to accomplish by wearing it?  What does the armband signify?  What is Blood Honour? What is the National Socialist Party?  What does this young man find so attractive and compelling about these organizations?  Do these groups have extremist, racist, anti-Semitic or other hate agenda?   

            What is “hate speech” and when does it become conduct? If it is not conduct but “only” speech, does the university want to have free speech or would we rather have the administration censor and restrict speech, and by definition, eliminate free speech on our campus. 

            This kind of thoughtful, informed, deliberate community process, public forum and civil discourse may take a little more time, but contrary to the feelings of some, we do have time to address these matters thoughtfully and carefully. Taking time to explore these matters not only would be responsible and appropriate given their nature, but it would emphasize how very seriously we take our community’s short term and long term well being, and our vibrancy and vitality as a private, Catholic university. 

To facilitate this study and public discussion, I am creating a small, representative Presidential Task Force on Free Speech at Bellarmine University which will develop and lead a process for a broad, campus-wide discussion of this issue. It will then submit findings and recommendations to me in a final report. I will provide whatever budgetary support is needed to support the group’s work and activity. 

This Task Force will include the Provost and the Vice President for Student  Affairs, the Chairs of the Faculty and the Staff Councils, the Director of Human Resources and the President of the Student Government Association.  

            I look forward to the Task Force’s findings and recommendations. What the Task Force does now will serve as a model for how we might best resolve conflicts that arise within our University community in the future. Drs. Cimbolic and Rhodes will convene the first meeting of the group within the next week.  I will attend the first meeting to answer any questions that the Task Force members may have about my charge to them. 

Sincerely, 

Dr. Joseph J. McGowan
President

December 5, 2005

Milton-

            I realize that you are extremely focused on this issue but if you step back for one moment and look at the email in which you noted you’d be “keeping an eye” on the student, I think you will see how Bill (and I) could interpret that as threatening to the student.  I hope it wasn’t your intent, but frankly your notes since then haven’t really dissuaded me.  Threatening a student is just plain indefensible and I really think it’s counter-productive to the cause.  A wise man (I believe it was the author of the BC cartoon) once said “He who fights fire with fire makes an ash of himself.”  Milton, Bellarmine needs you to be a leader… not an ash.    

            Also, I realize this is a very important issue and individuals will invest various amounts of emotion into it, but I hope you will please understand that intelligent, caring people can disagree about the level of threat presented by an arm band.  It seems to me that is the precise issue here.  I haven’t seen any emails or campus activity that indicates there is a swelling of white supremacists among our ranks.  Just because I’m a white male, that doesn’t mean that I am de facto unable to comprehend the perceived fears of others.  I do not support the neo-nazis and their ilk, but I also don’t think that letting them have free speech (or specifically the freedom to dress as they wish) is supporting them.  I’m supporting the American way.  I know I risk being labeled as one with my cranium in the sand, but I truly feel that if this student is ignored he’ll eventually become very lonely and either leave or maybe, just maybe, he’ll see that wearing a swastika-like image is not the best way to make a good impression with your fellow human beings.  Galileo said “you cannot teach a man anything, you can only help him find it within himself.”            

            Peace,

-David    

An Open Letter on the Armband Controversy

 The controversy that has erupted here at Bellarmine over Andrei Chira’s choice to display an armband on campus bearing the insignia of a neo-Nazi group has been troubling on many levels. To date, virtually no one, with the exception of Mr. Chira himself, has spoken out in defense of the specific ideology the armband represents; there seems to be a general consensus that it is morally objectionable and runs contrary to Bellarmine’s communally-held values. However, a curious divide has opened up over what, if anything, Bellarmine should do about Mr. Chira’s actions. On one side of the divide, we find the argument that the display of symbols that express ideologies of hate on campus constitutes a moral injury to the community sufficiently grievous to warrant official efforts to restrain or enjoin Mr. Chira; Dr. Josh Golding’s e-mail message, now posted to Dr. Bill Tietjen’s website, is a prime example of this argument. On the other side, we find the argument that Mr. Chira’s actions, while morally offensive, do not constitute a moral injury sufficiently grave to justify the threat that official efforts to restrain or enjoin Mr. Chira would pose to the value we place on freedom of inquiry and expression. Dr. Tietjen’s response to Dr. Golding’s letter, also posted to the same website, is a prime example of this argument, and Dr. McGowan’s official stated position as President of the university rests on similar reasoning.

 In the end, Bellarmine and its official representatives, including its faculty, will be obliged to live within what the law requires. Since my legal knowledge comes either at second-hand or through independent research, I am not qualified to offer substantive advice. I do know enough to know that, due to the complexity of First Amendment law, Bellarmine will no doubt have to tread carefully. By putting the brakes on any swift action, Dr. McGowan’s formation of a Task Force devoted to exploring the issue probably reflects the institutional necessity of taking a time out to explore the legal options. However, the public debate on campus has not, so far as I have seen, been informed by much expert legal opinion. While it is understandable that the university would want to explore its legal options privately, away from the heat of a public debate, it is regrettable that Bellarmine has not made its legal position—or perhaps, its current lack of one—clearer to the community.

 While we all wait for that clarification, however, the public debate on campus has traded on arguments drawn from broad moral and political principles. On this score, I fear that much of the debate, and the controversy that has ensued over it, has managed to kick up a cloud of sand that has obscured the issues involved. This state of affairs is unfortunate, since, as you will see, I believe that one side of the divide that has opened up—the side, represented by Josh Golding, Milton Brown, and others, that Mr. Chira’s actions are sufficiently morally injurious to warrant official action—has the better side of the argument. While it appears that many of the faculty share this point of view, I haven’t seen or heard a great deal of argument yet, other than from the above-mentioned persons, that would defend it against the objections Dr. Tietjen explicitly raises (and that Dr. McGowan raises implicitly).

 Although Dr. Tietjen may characterize his argument differently (I hope he will correct me if I am wrong!), I take it to be a version of what political philosophers would call a “classical liberal” argument. (Please note: this use of the word “liberal” is not quite the same as the way the word is used in American political discourse; there are ‘conservatives’ in the U.S. who would be classical liberals in this sense of the word.) In particular, this argument invokes a distinction between offense and harm made famous by the philosopher John Stuart Mill. Harm, so the argument goes, involves direct injury or threat to an individual's life, person, property, or livelihood, and so is morally speaking a proper object of legal restraint. Offense, by contrast, involves conduct that does not produce harm (as defined above), but which an individual nevertheless finds objectionable on other grounds. Offense, so this argument goes, might be morally objectionable, but is not sufficiently so to warrant restraining a person's freedom of expression. The value of upholding freedom of expression, in other words, outweighs the value of preventing offense. In the case at hand, then, the classical liberal position, as construed by Dr. Tietjen, is to argue that Mr. Chira's armband has not caused harm, only offense, and so on the strength of the above argument, there is no (moral or legal) warrant for restraining his freedom of expression in this instance.

 However, I believe that this argument fails on two counts. First, it fails for reasons that have to do with the application of the argument to the particular case at hand and that should concern even the most devoted advocate of the classical liberal point of view. Second, it fails as a result of a problem inherent in the classical liberal argument itself: namely, its failure to balance the value of free expression against other equally important liberal values.

 To the first point: even if one accepts the underlying moral and legal distinction between offense and harm, Mr. Chira's decision to wear an armband likely produces a type of harm that is sufficiently grievous to warrant restraint. (Once again, I am speaking here as a philosopher, not as a legal expert. Legal experts will have to advise Bellarmine on its legal options.) As Dr. Golding correctly noted in his letter, wearing an armband that promotes neo-Nazi ideology is not just, or not even primarily, advocating for a point of view. Wearing such a symbol is, regardless of the intentions of the one wearing it, an act whose net effect is to threaten direct harms that no one could reasonably deny are proper objects of legal restraint. Wearing such a symbol is to raise the specter of violence, torture, and murder; even if the one wearing it would never in a million years engage in torture and murder himself, wearing the symbol sends the message that there are others out there who might feel perfectly comfortable doing just that. In other words, it is to raise the specter of a "movement" that transcends the individual involved. This specter exists regardless of the actual number of neo-Nazis that are, or are not, currently at Bellarmine; in other words, the armband has its effect regardless of the fact that, as one faculty member noted, “I haven’t seen any emails or campus activity that indicates there is a swelling of white supremacists among our ranks.” This remark is correct, but it mistakes the way such threats work. Those who were, and are, the customary targets of National Socialism and neo-Nazi movements-- Jews, racial minorities, homosexuals-- are entirely justified to perceive this symbol as a threat of harm.

 Now, the classical liberal may well ask: Since when did the threat of harm constitute actual harm? I acknowledge that this is a problem, but I think the case can be made that, even within a classical liberal framework, the threat of harm is certainly more morally objectionable than mere offense. In fact, I think there are strong reasons for classifying this sort of threat as itself harmful. This is because the threat of harm constitutes a kind of psychological harm that distinguishes it from the sort of offense the classical liberal argument has in mind. One takes offense out of value-commitments that don't affect one's vital interests directly. I might be offended, for instance, by works of art that mock my religion, but my offense isn't tied to my vital interest in, e.g. not getting all of my property seized or not getting killed in the most gruesome way imaginable. In our part of the world, anyway, adherents of my religion (Christianity) do not routinely have their vital interests threatened solely as a result of their religious profession, and so I have little justified reason to see mockery of my religion as anything but offensive. I find it grievous and insulting, and I think that it raises moral questions, but I don’t think that it constitutes a moral offense so great that the law should get involved.

 This feature of psychological harm also helps to explain why many people have difficulty understanding it when it occurs in others. For people like me, members of the white Christian majority, neo-Nazi ideology merely offends us because it violates general principles of tolerance and egalitarianism that we sincerely hold. Most of us in the white Christian majority, however, have never had our tolerant and egalitarian beliefs seriously put to the test, though, since we are not routinely the targets of those who don't share those beliefs. In other words, we might find the idea of a neo-Nazi society morally abhorrent, but since we aren't among the traditional groups such a society would target for discrimination (or worse), we feel deep down that we might be able to "pass" in such a society. (Although if the history of National Socialist Germany is any precedent, academics with vaguely liberal tendencies-- in other words, people much like many faculty members here at Bellarmine-- would have much to fear in such a society, regardless of how they are racially or religiously identified.) However, persons who do fall within groups that are the targets of Nazi and neo-Nazi ideology have good reason to perceive the threat as a threat to their vital interests, however indirect the threat might be. In other words, some people have good reason to perceive an expression as a threat and others don't. In fact, it might even be dishonest, even morally indecent, if someone like me claimed to feel as threatened by neo-Nazis as members of the groups neo-Nazis usually target feel.

 Since it is difficult to appreciate psychological harm induced by threats to which one is not subject, and impossible to understand it completely, it is not surprising that many insist on seeing the harm involved in this case as just offense. Dr. Tietjen, for example, has reiterated the argument several times that, if Bellarmine were to curtail hate speech, then there might be no limit to the offensive speech it might curtail next. He raises the possibility that Bellarmine might ban, for example, Goths, or wearers of leather, or anything that anyone finds offensive. This argument only works, though, if we classify the particular form of hate speech in question as a mere cause of offense, or if we more broadly deny that any form of speech can be harmful. I believe that the argument I have just made goes some way towards articulating a principled way of distinguishing between speech which is psychologically harmful (and therefore a proper object of restraint) and speech which is merely offensive (which is not), and hence renders moot the worry that we risk sliding down a slippery slope. Dressing in Goth clothing or wearing leather does not send the same harmful message as wearing neo-Nazi symbols, since Goths and leather-wearers have not been historically guilty of high crimes against humanity.

 I sincerely doubt that Dr. Tietjen fails to recognize that there is a difference between wearing neo-Nazi armbands and wearing leather clothing. I sense instead that Dr. Tietjen, as an advocate of the classical liberal point of view, is defending a principle. (I hope he will correct me if I am wrong.) Classical liberals usually prefer a very constrained definition of harm, since they want to restrict as much as possible the range of unwanted governmental intrusion into our lives. The fewer the number of conceivable harms, the fewer the number of cases in which external authorities may justifiably interfere with individuals’ personal freedom. The value of personal freedom, including freedom of expression, is so high on this point of view that, in cases where there is room for reasonable doubt that an action constitutes harm, it is preferable to classify it as offense. From a classical liberal point of view, psychological harm is morally regrettable, perhaps, but since it fails to be the sort of harm that any observer can directly perceive (like, for instance, an injury to one’s body is), its existence is disputable and hence not the sort of thing we should consider actionable. Furthermore, the classical liberal might ask, can’t someone like Mr. Chira always claim that he is expressing an idea, however objectionable others may find it? Mr. Chira may claim to be taking a principled stand; those who claim to find his principled stand problematic can’t, from the classical liberal standpoint, justify silencing him on the basis of psychological harm.

 It is at this point, though, that the classical liberal position begins to exhibit a kind of tunnel vision. (Actually, though, I’m not convinced that Mill, the originator of this type of argument, was guilty of the same flaw, at least not to the same degree; but that’s another discussion.) First of all, it makes the mistake of equating wearing of an armband with taking a principled stand. At bottom, calling the display of neo-Nazi symbols in public an infliction of psychological harm is tied to the fact that neo-Nazis aren't demanding that others agree to the truth of certain purely theoretical value judgments (e.g. "Whites are superior to non-Whites"). In fact, if their intent is to persuade others of the rightness of their point of view, then wearing an armband alone isn’t going to accomplish anything, and they know it. By wearing offensive symbols, neo-Nazis are effectively demanding that those who share their beliefs should be prepared to act on them. Armbands serve the same function as bumper stickers on cars. The vast majority of bumper stickers aren’t psychologically harmful, of course; having a bumper sticker that says “Bush/Cheney ‘04” or “Kerry/Edwards” doesn’t make a threat of institutional violence. It just asks you to vote for someone. Historically, though, National Socialism is a radical social program that could not be instituted without extreme violence to persons, not to mention current social institutions. In short, wearing an armband as a purely symbolic expression of adherence to a neo-Nazi cause isn't a serious attempt to defend the truth of a value judgment, since it doesn't actually give reasons. As such, purely symbolic expressions of neo-Nazi ideology are not inert "goods" to be bought and sold in a hypothetical "marketplace of ideas." They are both a call to action and an attempt to intimidate certain groups of persons in ways that significantly threaten their existence.

 It is this latter point that I believe Dr. Golding meant to underscore in his letter when he stated, "If a person claims he believes only in certain ‘economic’ or ‘political’ policies associated with fascist regimes, he may express such views WITHOUT wearing the Neo-Nazi symbol which sends the hateful message described above. The fact that such a person continues to wear the symbol shows this disclaimer is not genuine." Although Dr. Golding may disagree with me (I haven’t discussed this issue with him), I would argue that the reason why this appeal works is that it highlights the fact that freedom of expression is not the sole value that should govern the use of power in a just liberal society. Freedom of expression is an important value from which individuals deserve to benefit, but the price of enjoying that benefit is a moral obligation to hold one’s beliefs and conduct accountable to other persons. The value of persons who submit themselves and their beliefs to public scrutiny is no less a liberal value than the sheer freedom to sound off. On this ampler liberal view, if a person publicly expresses beliefs that directly entail that we should treat persons or groups of persons in a way that radically threatens their vital interests, then that person has the moral burden to give reasons to the very persons who will find themselves affected—in other words, to the very persons he is threatening. Let’s call this the justification of harm principle. In a just society, if we are going to argue in public that certain persons should have to bear burdens that directly affect their vital interest, we should at the very least make an attempt to justify those burdens to those affected.

 The value of giving reasons and justifying harms has always been a sore spot in American life. The founders, for instance, did not speak with one voice on it; Thomas Jefferson is the one most consistently identified with it. It is not surprising, then that many advocates of the classical liberal argument prefer to disregard this core value. In the public discourse surrounding the armband controversy here at Bellarmine, for instance, many have made the suggestion that the burden of giving reasons is distributed very differently. In their view, it falls largely, if not exclusively, on the rest of us to wait patiently for the neo-Nazi ideologue’s reasons, or, failing that, to supply them on his behalf. For instance, Dr. McGowan, in his open letter of December 5, 2005, asks us to do as follows: “A good place to start is to learn the facts. Where is our student coming from on this?  Why is he wearing the armband?  What does he hope to accomplish by wearing it?  What does the armband signify?  What is Blood Honour? What is the National Socialist Party?  What does this young man find so attractive and compelling about these organizations?  Do these groups have extremist, racist, anti-Semitic or other hate agenda?” In my view, saying this is to misunderstand just who is guilty of what. It is, as some minority students have noted, to “blame the victims” for “feeling offended” and to set up the person who is guilty of causing harm as a victim himself! It is just to pretend that symbolic hate speech does no harm and then turn around and make an attempt to justify the harm it does. Since history has told us what the net practical effect of neo-Nazi ideology is, the burden of proof here lies on the neo-Nazi ideologue to justify murder and genocide, or else to explain why his position, unlike National Socialism, doesn’t entail these things. Wearing an armband that signals historical continuity with National Socialism (even without the swastika) would undercut any such argument—just the point Dr. Golding made in his e-mail.

 However, it is apparent that, were a defender of neo-Nazi ideology to take the justification of harm principle seriously, it would involve him in a self-contradiction. A tenet of the belief-system in question would be (as I take it) that certain groups of people, those groups that the ideology singles out as inferior, lack moral standing—in other words, that it is neither morally necessary nor worthwhile to justify one’s conduct to them. To then turn around and attempt to justify one’s potential infliction of harm to just those groups would obviously be self-contradictory. Faced with just such a contradiction, I take it that the ideologue must jettison the justification of harm principle. In doing so, the neo-Nazi ideologue would at least remain consistent with his own principles, but would at the same time unmask the true nature of his ideology—an ideology that is not only harmful, but is also inconsistent with the values of a liberal and just society. It is no wonder, then, that neo-Nazi groups prefer to abandon the territory of reasoned argument altogether and, through purely symbolic gestures, insinuate their beliefs into public discourse without ever having to submit them to scrutiny. In essence, it is an implicit admission of the intellectual weakness of their position.

 I suspect that on this last point—the intellectual and moral bankruptcy of neo-Nazism— those on the other philosophical side from me would agree with me. Where we seem to disagree, I take it, is that they believe that, since there are still people in the world who hold neo-Nazi beliefs, there is something to be gained by exposing those beliefs, and the persons who hold them, to the open air, as it were, so as to make that moral bankruptcy apparent to everyone. Like the “invisible hand” in Adam Smith’s economic theory (one of the cornerstones of the classical liberal point of view) that governs markets, we should have faith in the “marketplace of ideas” to condemn bankrupt ideologies to failure. I disagree. If there is such a thing as a “marketplace of ideas,” it can only function if those who exchange in it share a commitment to the process of giving reasons, and there is plausibly room for governmental authorities to exercise some very careful and principled regulation in this regard. (Free economic markets, for that matter, can’t survive in the absence of shared civil values and even certain governmental regulations.)

 Decent persons in a just society (a society worth striving for) shouldn’t have to expose certain among their number to psychological harm in order to defend a principle that is one-sided to begin with. Doing so gives us the spectacle we have seen: A respected institution of higher learning expending its considerable intellectual and moral authority defending the presumed rights of neo-Nazis to terrorize other students. I fear that this is what has created the perception among minority students that the university isn’t sensitive to their concerns. Even though they haven’t done anything particularly wrong, they see a person who unjustly threatens them officially sheltered by the administration and much of the student body and wrapped in the mantle of high principle. Mr. Chira has, in fact, hoodwinked the administration and many of the faculty and students of the university into making a choice they shouldn’t have to make between important values that don’t really conflict with one another. This trap is just the trap hate groups lay out for liberal institutions, so that, when they fall into them, they can point to the squabbles that arise as evidence for their erroneous belief that liberal institutions, not their ideologies, are morally and intellectually bankrupt. I sincerely hope that Bellarmine can avoid falling into this trap, and in doing so set an example for other institutions trying to navigate these waters. 

I feel particularly saddened to make observations like the foregoing. As my remarks indicate, I can’t help but believe that the agreements between my point of view and the point of view represented by Dr. Tietjen and Dr. McGowan far outnumber the disagreements. One of the most subtle and lamentable effects ideologies of hate have on public discourse is that they exploit epistemic weaknesses—in this case, the difficulty of recognizing psychological harms to which one is not personally subject—at the same time as they exploit legitimate moral and political principles—in this case, the legitimate value of free expression. They are to the moral life of the “body politic” what autoimmune disorders like rheumatoid arthritis are to the individual body—they wield the body’s own defenses as weapons against it. And, just like autoimmune disorders, they are something no one need suffer gladly. 

Dr. Brian Cubbage
Adjunct Faculty
Philosophy Department 

I am responding on behalf of Dr. McGowan to Greg Wagner’s e-mail on the free speech issue. This is the most engaged the university community has been on any issue in memory, and it is the beginning of a great campus-wide conversation about free speech and all the issues that surround it.  Already, we can tell from correspondence that every group – faculty, staff, students, alumni and friends – have a wide range of sincere and passionate views on all sides of the questions that have been raised. (The one important and obvious exception is that the views represented by the armband itself are universally rejected and condemned in our community.)

As many of you know, Dr. McGowan has created a Presidential Task Force to lead a broad, inclusive and educational conversation about free speech and all the surrounding issues, and to include recommendations in a final report. 

I am attaching the President’s message to the University community announcing the creation of this task force, in case any of you missed it.

Hunt C. Helm
Vice President for University Relations
Bellarmine University

(In response to the above letter....)

Friends, 

I hope the e-mail police don’t take me away during the holidays.  

This is the most engaged the University (both faculty and students) has been in a long time. However, those of you that were here during the Thorburn years will remember another series of engagement by both students and faculty. 

The following was experienced:

• A protest organized by students during the official opening of the library.
• Student sit-ins.
• Weeks or months of Concord articles.
• A special issue of the Discord devoted almost entirely to this topic.
• Student organizations getting involved.
• A guerilla website organized by students.
• And, of course, faculty and administrators at each other’s throats…

This response was larger than the current one, but that’s probably because this incident occurred at the end of the semester. What both of these issues have in common are mass e-mails. Without the mass e-mails the students would not have become involved and, perhaps, many of the faculty. This issue has been a topic in the Concord and there have been several meetings among both students and faculty, but the topic didn’t become engaging until the mass e-mails started. I certainly would not have become involved without the e-mails and I wouldn’t be surprised if many of the other faculty would not have commented. 

The e-mails allowed students to become involved, at least at the level of observers. Some students writing off-campus were able to respond to all, but even those on campus had an opportunity through my web site and through the public folders. Initially only my site was available for student comments but later the public folders became available. Both serve a different purpose. Many students confided in me that they were unwilling to post to the public folders because there was no anonymity. This came from students on both sides of the argument. Many did not mind posting to the folder and quite a lively discussion ensued, although I found it sometimes took on the flavor of a chat room. Also, it doesn’t appear as if faculty took part in this option. 

Therefore, I submit that mass e-mails should be allowed. Perhaps the following compromises would allow this to happen without overwhelming our system:

• Unlimited mass e-mails among faculty and from faculty to students would be allowed.
• Students should be limited to the same options they had this past week.
• A web site should be put together for student comments (or I’ll just do it).
• Public folders should be set up to allow a different venue for comments.
• Faculty should feel free to comment through the e-mail system and the public folders.
• Faculty should not answer any student e-mails publicly to cut back on traffic. Faculty could, of course, answer these e-mails personally.
• All e-mail should have a common subject line, perhaps “RE: Campus Speech”. If more detail is required in the subject line, the additional information could be tacked on at the end of the subject (“RE: Campus Speech- Student Meeting”). This would allow those that have no interest in the topic to sort by subject matter and then easily delete everything. It would also make it easier for those following the thread to pay attention and clear their boxes.
• We could all agree that after the first level of a post we would delete all e-mails below that. If you answer an e-mail you would include the immediate e-mail you were answering and would delete everything below that. This way the question/answer link would be preserved, but the email size wouldn’t constantly increase. This should also save resources.
• Beyond the first post, all attachments should be deleted (like this: )
• Both students and faculty should be encouraged to empty their boxes when the load gets too high. They should be reminded to also remove items from their deleted and sent folders. This could be overseen by IT.
• Since the thread will be lost someone (IT?) should maintain the information for later posting. I made sure to keep every student e-mail, but couldn’t keep up with faculty responses and much of that history has been lost. I had to remove these responses from my box to ensure that it would be open for current responses and e-mails from my regular classes (including final projects).
• Perhaps IT could restrict e-mails of the sort we had last Monday and Tuesday to just two days every week or few (unless changing events warrant otherwise). That would allow everyone time to clean their mail and reflect on the public and private responses.

If we are allowed mass e-mails on this and a variety of other topics, I think we can get and keep our students involved. Everything should be done to foster these types of interactions. Perhaps when student interests are peaked, we can fall back on free period and evening meetings that both students and faculty will attend. 

BillT

I'm responding to Sandi's and Michelle's exchange from yesterday. I find it odd to imagine that a person's constitutional rights, however construed, somehow end once one is on privately-owned property, and that way of thinking about it might be wrong.

The question of how to construe free speech rights is one best left up to the lawyers (I'm not one), but I have heard enough to know that there are a couple of different concepts of "public" floating around in this discussion that MAY-- repeat, MAY-- be legally distinct. On the one hand, "public" can mean publicly owned or held-- in other words, property of a local, state, or federal government. Bellarmine certainly isn't that, although to the extent that BU and its students receive federal money (e.g. in the form of financial aid) BU has federally mandated obligations. (I don't think, though, that these have much at all to do with its constitutionally-defined obligations, whatever they might be, since these obligations are defined by federal statute.)

However, "public" can simply mean "public place," in the sense that one should have a reasonable expectation that others could be observing one's conduct. Plenty of privately owned or held properties would count as "public" in this sense-- the front lawn of my house, for instance, or the quadrangle out in front of Lyons Library here at Bellarmine. Although the Bill of Rights doesn't specifically enumerate a right to privacy, a chain of Supreme Court precedents has held that a right to privacy can be reasonably construed from the Bill of Rights and the 14th Amendment. The usual way the right to privacy in this sense works, as I recall, is that your right to privacy extends to areas in which you have a "reasonable expectation of privacy"-- in other words, you have no reason to think that anyone would, or could, be eavesdropping on you. Once you are in a place where you have no reasonable expectation of privacy, I take it that your (court-construed) right to privacy basically ends.

If this second kind of "public" is what we're talking about, then few places other than, say, bathroom stalls or residence hall rooms at Bellarmine would count as private. And if this is the type of "public" place that is relevant to discussions of free speech rights, then most of Bellarmine's campus would probably be subject to the same laws and norms of free speech that govern the rest of the country.

Now, keep in mind that this post does NOT come from a lawyer, although I teach philosophy and ethics and have done a small amount of research on these issues. As a philosopher, what I can say with more conviction than the above is that, aside from the legal questions involved, whether free speech rights should extend to hate speech is complicated, as the posts to this thread make abundantly clear. I have to agree with another post to this thread that this is as good an opportunity as any for a relatively small, closed community such as Bellarmine to ask itself what its core values are.

Brian Cubbage